Communicated by James Serrin, October 21, 1971
1. Introduction. Two person zero-sum differential games can be considered as control problems with two opposing controllers or players. One player seeks to maximize and one to minimize the pay-off function. The greatest pay-off that the maximizing player can force is termed the lower value of the game and similarly the least value which the minimizing player can force is called the upper value. Our objective is to determine conditions under which these values coincide.
In the case of two person zero-sum matrix games, von Neumann showed that if the players are allowed "mixed strategies," i.e., probability measures over the pure strategies, then the values of the game will coincide. By analogy, the authors in collaboration with L. Markus [1] introduced relaxed controls into differential game theory; for a full discussion of relaxed controls the reader is referred to [1] .
In this announcement, we define notions of strategy and values and relate these to the approaches adopted by Fleming [3] , [4] and Friedman [5] . Using relaxed controls we are able to show that if the "Isaacs condition" (3) is satisfied then the upper and lower values are equal, so that the game has value. In particular, if the players are allowed relaxed controls then the game always has value. Detailed proofs of these results will appear in a later publication [2] .
2. Notation. A differential game G played by two players J x and J 2 for the fixed time interval / = [0,1] is considered. At each time teI 9 J t picks an element y(t) from a compact metric space Y and J 2 picks z(t) from a similar space Z in such a way that the functions t -• y(t) and t -+ z(t) are measurable. The dynamics are given by the differential equation
x,y(t),z(t)).
Here x e R m and f:I x R m x Y x Z -• R m is a continuous function. For simplicity of exposition we assume ƒ satisfies constant Lipschitz conditions in t and x. Assuming x(0) = 0, the above conditions ensure that for any pair of functions (y(t\ z(t)) there is a trajectory x(t). At the end of the game a pay-off to J l9 is computed. Here g is a differentiable function R m -• R which, together with its first two derivatives satisfies Lipschitz conditions in x. Also h:I x R" 1 x Y x Z -+ R is continuous and satisfies Lipschitz conditions in x and t.
As the game is zero-sum the aim of J x is to maximize the pay-off whilst J2 is trying to minimize the pay-off. Any map 0L\Ji 2 -• «^I is called a pseudo-strategy for J v Each pseudostrategy has a value w(a) = inf ze^2 P(az, z), giving the worst possible result for J x if he adopts pseudo-strategy a. Not all pseudo-strategies are reasonable as they imply a foreknowledge of the opponent's choice of control function. Thus a : Jt 2 -• Jt x is called a strategy if, whenever 0 < T ^ 1 and Zl (t) = z 2 (t) a.e., 0 ^ t ^ T 9 then az^f) = az 2 (r) a.e., 0 <; r ^ T. Similar definitions are made for J 2 . The set of strategies for J t is denoted by T and the set of strategies for J 2 by A. The value U of the game to J x is then The game Ej has the same dynamics and pay-off as G but it is played as follows : J 2 selects a control function on I x and then J t selects a control function on I u and the players then play alternately, J 2 selecting his function on ƒ, before J v From the theory of alternate move games it follows that the game E$ has a value KjJ. For the details of this approach see Friedman [5] .
Strategies. Denote by
It follows immediately that KjJ ^ ¥£+1 for all N, and so we may define V + = lim^^ Vjj. V + is the upper value of the game in the sense of Friedman. The game Eü is defined like Ej$ except that J x plays first at each step. Eü has a value V^ and V~ = lim^^ V^ is called the lower value of the game. As Vjj ^ Vjj f°r a 'l N we have V~ ^ F + , and G is said to have a value in the sense of Friedman if V + = V~. Using pseudo-strategies with certain delays we can relate the approach of §3 and that of Friedman and show, in particular,
In reference [5] Friedman shows that V + = V~ if the dynamics are of the form * = fi(t,x,y) + f 2 (t,x,z) and the function h in the pay-off is of the form h^t, x, y) + h 2 (t 9 x, z). By the theory of alternate move games this has a value VK^J. Similarly, the game K^9 in which ^ plays first at each step, has a value W^. We may also consider Kj starting at time t k with initial condition x(t k ) = x. This game has a value W^(t k9 x) and a dynamic programming argument shows
Wji{t k9 x) = minmax{W^(f fc+1 ,x') + ôh(t k9 x 9 y 9 z)} 9 z y where x' = x + Sf(t k9 x, y 9 z) and W + (l, x) = g(x). Considerations of this kind led Isaacs [7] 
